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 Appearance vs. Reality as a Scientific Problem
Bas C. van Fraassen
la pittura è una specie di natural filosofia, perché l’imita la quantità e 
qualità, la forma e virtù delle cose naturali.1 
 
If science is a representation of nature, what precisely does it represent? 
Paintings and photos depict things as they appear to us in perception.  A 
scientific theory may be said in contrast to depict things as they are.  The 
differences between the two can be striking, and are typically fodder for skeptical 
arguments such as Descartes adapted to urge the superiority of intellectual 
understanding over the senses.  How an object is represented in Descartes’ new 
analytic geometry was thus very different from that same object’s depiction 
by the painter.
But in the end we can only evaluate the accuracy of any representation by 
attending to how the represented object appears to us.  So even if a scientific 
theory or model represents how things really are, the scientific account is 
not finished unless it has clear implications for what their appearance will 
be like under realizable conditions.  To be complete — even if we merely 
see completeness as a regulative ideal, possibly not humanly achievable — 
requires a science then to represent the appearances as well as the theoretically 
postulated reality. 
“Reality” and “Appearance” are philosophically loaded terms.  In our context 
they are to be understood quite prosaically.  For example, the theoretically 
postulated reality is a world consisting of atoms, while the appearances are 
the smelly, colorful, noisy things we perceive, such as apples and horses.  Here 
“appearance” does not refer to subjectively experienced impressions, and 
“reality” does not refer to Kantian ‘things-in-themselves’.  In fact, the relevant 
appearances are the ways that things and processes appear in measurement 
outcomes (as I shall elaborate below) and thus publically accessible.
Any claim that science’s account of the postulated reality is already  complete 
all by itself, in principle, is therefore challenged to give an account of the 
appearances.  This challenge, so very clear to the 17th century scientist-
philosophers, was posed dramatically for our time by Einstein and his colleagues 
in “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered 
complete?”.   In fact the challenge is perennial and time and again it precipitates 
radical, revolutionary changes in the sciences.  As I will argue here, these 
radical changes radiate outward from the content of the new theories to the 
very methodology of science and to the conception of what science is to be.
1.  A salient criterion:  Appearance from Reality
2
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If science is a representation of nature, criteria for its success or completeness 
must be related to that task, and must appear concretely in scientific theory 
choice and evaluation.  They are not just debated among philosophers, but 
have been centrally at issue in famous episodes in the sciences themselves. 
Remarkably, scientific progress at times involves precisely the rejection of 
previously proclaimed criteria.  Remarkably, also, the aftermaths of such 
developments typically involve sustained reactionary philosophical efforts at 
restoration.  
That typical historical pattern seems to be this.  A certain criterion of 
completeness is held up at least as an ideal — but as attainable ideal — for 
science. Perhaps it is even said to be satisfied already, details apart. Embattled by 
new empirical findings, scientists violate and reject the criterion, and succeed 
by their own new lights. This is hailed as a triumph over a now discredited 
philosophical ideal.  But then the reaction sets in as well:  after that success 
many philosophers and reflective scientists strive mightily to reinstate the 
rejected criterion, or show it to be “essentially” satisfied  after all. 
As first example consider the Aristotelian ideal that science must explain how 
things happen by demonstrating that they must happen in the way they do.  It 
requires that the regularities in the phenomena derive from universal necessary 
principles.  Galileo, Gassendi, Boyle, Descartes, and Newton consciously and 
explicitly refuse to take on this Aristotelian task for science, or to accept it 
as criterion for scientific success.  Indeed, they claim that in the modern era 
scientific success derives largely from their rejection of that tradition.
But already in other passages at the hands of these very same writers, we see 
the ideal, and that criterion, advocated in an even stronger form!   There is talk 
of laws of nature, not all that clearly distinguished from those lambasted and 
ridiculed constraints of Aristotelian physics.  Even more extreme sentiments take 
hold:  the regularities must derive from not just natural but logical necessity.2  
This sentiment is sometimes encountered still, in physicists’ dreams of a final 
theory so logically airtight as to admit of no conceivable alternative, that would 
be grasped as true when understood at all.   
However that may be, there is one criterion that appears to be quite generally 
accepted at least among philosophers and by the general public. 
Physics in the modern era depicts nature as being quite different from how it 
appears.  The theoretically postulated reality is different from the appearances. 
The disparity becomes truly salient when Galileo and Gassendi embrace atomism, 
which had been revived in the Renaissance.  Those atoms have only primary 
properties such as shape, volume, and number; the appearances are colorful, 
noisy, smelly, and tasty.   Descartes, though not an atomist, goes further by 
restricting the real attributes of matter to extension in space and time.  Newton 
rejects this ontological asceticism when he introduces forces and mass.  But 
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these additions certainly don’t diminish the disparity, nor do classical fields 
when they are introduced later either to augment or to replace matter. 
But at the same time these founders of modern science accept that physics 
must explain how those appearances are produced in reality.  It is the demand 
that this noisy, colorful, smelly but tasty world of appearance be fully explained 
in terms of the attributes that science explicitly counts among its significant 
parameters. Science is understood to be incomplete until and unless it meets 
that demand.  I will call it the Appearance from Reality Criterion.   
Examples abound to make us immediately sympathetic to the idea that this 
demand governs and guides the scientific enterprise.  We credit science with 
adequate and satisfactory explanations of how many familiar phenomena are 
produced: how ash is produced when we burn a cigarette or some logs, how 
methane is naturally produced in a swamp, and how a flame is turned yellow 
when a sodium sample is inserted.  The last example is already one in which 
an aspect of appearance (color) is explained, and this explanation is continued 
from optics  to the physiology of vision.  In this way the scientific representation 
of nature is shown to include the appearances in a very specific, particular way. 
Their ‘derivation’ is not just as fitting into that representation3 , but as produced 
as proper part of the depicted reality.
This is in effect a demand for explanation which is satisfiable only by 
connections deeper than brute or factual regularity.   Let us say that to be 
complete, physical science needs to derive the appearances from that reality 
— but the term “derive” cannot here just mean “deduce” or “predict”.  By 
“derive” we shall here have to mean a connection of the order of explanation 
through necessity and/or causal mechanisms to be displayed, which produce 
the appearances.  And while I see this as at the crux of 17th century natural 
philosophy, we can find it spelled out quite clearly in our own time in scientific 
realist writings:
A theory is not simply an empirical law or generalization to 
the effect that certain observable phenomena occur, but an 
explanation of their occurrence that provides some mechanism 
to produce them, or some deeper principles to which their 
production is reducible.4 
Thus writes Jarrett Leplin in his A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. 
What contrasts must he have in mind here?  When is this demand not met?  It 
is not met if science should simply issue successful predictions of measurement 
outcomes.  That does not suffice by itself even if the prediction is by means of 
systematic rules of calculation, from the state of nature theoretically described. 
4
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For calculational and predictive success does not ipso facto imply an explanation 
of why and how the appearances must be the way they are.   
2.  Apparent Rejections of the Fourth Criterion
 
If it seems that a science cannot show how certain appearances derive from 
what it postulates nature to be, various reactions are open to us.  
(1) We could still adhere to the Appearance from Reality 
Criterion, or to some still deeper criterion of completeness 
in explanation.   Then we would regard such a science as 
incomplete.
(2) We could deny that there is a gap to be filled, so to speak; it 
seems to me that this was the Copenhagen physicists’ response 
to criticisms of quantum mechanics. 
(3) Or we could advocate a certain metaphysical doctrine: 
there is a sense of “derive” (presumably related to notions of 
causality or necessity in nature) in which the Appearances do 
in fact derive from the theoretically described reality, but that 
connection in nature is beyond the resources of this science 
to make explicit.  
We have two quite salient examples in which the Appearance from Reality 
Criterion is ostensibly rejected as governing the sciences.  One comes from the 
recent history of physics, as I have already indicated.  The other comes from 
recent analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive science.  The logical form of 
such a rejection, however, I see already foreshadowed in the 17th century.  Let 
us begin with a brief look at each, and then go on to a more detailed inspection. 
The quantum mechanics challenge
The vehicle for prediction in quantum mechanics is, at heart, the Born Rule. 
In one form it allows calculation of an expectation value, which pertains to 
a weighted average in a large number of measurements.  In a simple form, it 
specifies the probability of any given possible outcome in a single measurement:
If observable A is measured on a system in quantum state Ψ, 
and  |r>  is the eigenstate of A corresponding to its possible 
value r, then the probability of outcome r is (|r>.Ψ)2
The details of this formula do not concern us yet — and the details of calculation 
won’t be needed here at any point.5   What matters for us at this point is just this:
(a)  that measurement outcomes are presumably a prime 
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examples of what we are to classify as appearances;  
(b) The quantum states are then the theoretically described 
reality,
and the question before us is then whether the former are so 
related to the latter as to satisfy the Appearance from Reality 
criterion.  
The Born Rule is one of conditional prediction.  What it predicts is what the 
appearances will be — with specified probabilities — under certain conditions. 
The Copenhagen physicists astonished not only traditional philosophers but 
also their colleagues by not recognizing, indeed refusing to acknowledge, any 
need to close the apparent gaps in explanation.
By itself the Born rule certainly does not give any information about how 
those appearances are produced.  Can we, by looking into quantum theory, 
find an answer to the question of how the measurement outcome comes about? 
Does this scientific theory display or allow for  a process, whether deterministic 
or stochastic, by which this appearance is produced?  That is the challenge, 
and we’ll discuss it at some length below.
The supervenience of mind challenge
 
Are psychology or cognitive science generally autonomous or must they be 
reducible to fundamental physics?  That is hardly a practical question for a 
working scientist, since we have no such reduction even for current materials 
science or chemistry, let alone physiology.  But we can ask about reducibility 
in principle, and that has been a central question in the story of ‘physicalism’ 
in 20th century analytic philosophy of mind.  
In the 1950s U.T. Place offered the hypothesis that certain events and processes 
traditionally classified as mental (for example, sensation) are identical with 
events and processes in the brain.6   He called this the materialist hypothesis.  It 
is in principle falsifiable, namely if the described ‘mental’ events and processes 
have a certain complexity, which brain events and processes do not have.7   
Not only this position but every claim concerning reduction of the 
psychological to the physical had to be given up in the course of the ensuing 
philosophical debates.  Yet our psychological discourse provides adequate, not 
to say indispensable, representations of the relevant phenomena.  The eventual 
claim, introduced to save materialism or physicalism in principle, became the 
much weaker one that, though irreducible, mental phenomena supervene our 
physical reality:
the actual psychological phenomena could not be different 
without a difference in the physical state (of the organism, or 
possibly the organism plus its natural environment, or possibly 
Appearance vs. Reality as a Scientific Problem    39
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of the entire universe).  
By classifying psychological phenomena — the subject of the science of cognitive 
psychology — as irreducible, this position implies a pertinent autonomy for that 
science, and its independence from fundamental physics.  For the ‘supervenience 
without reduction’ claim explicitly entails that no mechanism can be displayed 
even in principle for the production of the (mental) Appearances from the 
(supposedly physical) Reality.  Those appearances depend on the physical in 
the minimal sense that the appearances could not be otherwise without the 
physical state being different.  But they are not derivable in the relevant sense. 
The claim of non-reducibility implies that science is not, will not, and cannot 
be complete in the sense of deriving the psychological phenomena from the 
postulated physical reality.  On the basis that ought implies can we must then 
also conclude that science as a whole is not required to be complete in that sense.
I am not objecting here to the claim that the psychological phenomena 
supervene on the physical.  Nor am I even maintaining that this claim fails 
to adequately explain why those phenomena are or even must be what they 
are!  The point is rather that this position in the philosophy of mind implies 
that the Appearance from Reality Criterion is to be rejected as a completeness 
criterion for science as a whole.8 
The Great Leibnizian Escape move 
 
The ‘supervenience without reducibility’ claim asserts a connection in nature 
which cannot be displayed by means of a theoretical deduction.  Deduction 
is after all an operation to be carried out with certain resources — linguistic, 
logical, mathematical — and these resources have their limits.  While these 
limits are the proper domain of metamathematics, and have been made precise 
in our own day, they were vaguely perceived already in the 17th century.  
Here Leibniz stands out as aware of possible limits to science.  Like Descartes 
he seems to have initially harbored the dream of a complete theory of everything 
whose principles can be known a priori.  But after a certain point his vision 
changes.  Then he begins to distinguishing between necessary and contingent 
propositions:  
the former can be proved in a finite number of steps by 
reducing them through analysis of the involved concepts to 
identical propositions or primary principles, while the analysis 
of contingent propositions goes on ad infinitum. 
This is why we cannot know the truth of contingent propositions a priori. Only 
God alone can know this,  not because he can complete the required infinite 
7
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analysis, but rather because he intuits the whole analysis with one glance.
The criterion for distinguishing necessary from contingent 
truths emerges from the following feature, which only those who 
have in them a tincture of mathematics will easily understand: 
in the case of necessary truths an identical equation will be 
reached by carrying the analysis sufficiently far, which amounts 
to demonstrating the truth with geometrical rigor; whereas in 
the case of contingent truths the analysis proceeds to infinity, 
with reasons given for reasons, in such a way that there is 
never a complete demonstration although the underlying 
reason for the truth is always there, perfectly understood only 
by God, who, with one stroke of thought, goes through the 
whole infinite series.9  
In contemporary terms we could put it this way:  given the information that the 
physical state is thus or so, there is a strict entailment of what the appearances 
must be.  However, as we know from metamathematics, not all entailments 
are capturable by definable consequence operations.  
As I emphasized above, mere deducibility would also not ipso facto satisfy the 
Appearance from Reality Criterion.  But it is certainly a necessary condition 
for success by this criterion.  Remember after all that we are not discussing 
criteria for God’s creation or the structure of reality!  Our concern is with 
completeness criteria for the sciences.  
So analytic philosophy of mind is in effect offering cognitive science the 
Great Leibnizian Escape move:  there is a logical reduction of the phenomena 
to the real, but it is not graspable by a finite mind (read:  not definable by 
finitary or even recursive means ...).10   
3.  Phenomena versus visual appearances
 
There were two developments in techniques of representation before Galileo 
that we can see as feeding into the kinematic representation developed in his 
century.  The first was that of linear one-point perspective in painting, and 
the second Copernicus’ and Tycho’s mastery of transforming geometric models 
in astronomy so as to shift the center taken as ‘at rest’.  Both concentrated 
on how  a description of the visual appearance from particular vantage points 
can be derived from a reality admitting of many different vantage points. 
Both grew from the subject of Perspectiva, a melange of geometry, optics, and 
practical drafting techniques, and both were steps on the way to projective 
and descriptive geometry.  But the sorts of representation they provided were 
more than superficially different.
Appearance vs. Reality as a Scientific Problem    41
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For, if I may put this anachronistically,  the second dealt with transformations 
of frames of reference in Euclidean space and its consonant kinematics.  This 
technique was mastered in practice by the time of Copernicus though formalized 
only by the end of the 17th century.  In contrast, the study and perfection 
of perspectival drawing gave rise to the very different subject of projective 
geometry.   That too saw its first rigorous development  in the 17th century, 
but was then neglected, until coming into its own (with a unified treatment 
of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries) in the 19th century.  
This is not an incidental historical point.  Both forms of representation 
tend to be called “perspectival” and both tend to be thought of as depicting 
the appearances.  But they accomplish very different tasks.  Let us tentatively 
honor the difference between them with distinct terminologies.  The 
geometric representation of e.g. planets and planetary motion I’ll say depicts 
the phenomena, while perspectival drawing of the same events depicts the 
appearances.  The motions of the planets are indeed observable, from any 
point of view you like.  What these motions look like from a particular vantage 
point (i.e. in a particular measurement set-up) is their appearance (in the 
measurement outcome).  My terminology here is a bit contrived, I admit, but 
we do need two words to indicate the distinction.
Frames of reference versus visual perspective
 
Take a look at the two representations of a cube below.  On the left you see 
the geometric representation in the analytic style that Descartes introduced as 
a tool for physics.  I had to draw this on flat paper, and my drawing is not that 
geometric representation (which is three-dimensional) but a representation 
of a representation.  A moment’s reflection reveals that in passage from the 
real cube to the geometric representation all the Euclidean invariants are 
preserved:  distance, parallelism, orthogonality, angles in general.   (Even in 
my drawing, where unfortunately not all edges can be drawn to be of equal 
length, parallelism and equality of the parallel edges are preserved!)  
In the perspectival drawing on the right that is not the case at all.  As every 
school child learns, parallel lines in a direction away from the painter converge 
to a vanishing point on the horizon.  So neither parallelism nor metric equality 
of the cube’s edges is preserved.11    
A visual perspective contains comparatively little of the depicted objects 
and events, due to occlusion and projective distortion.  This is not a question of 
subjectivity: the same is true of a painting in this style or a photo.12   A geometric 
frame of reference on the other hand contains everything in the world, in 
geometrically (and kinematically, if time is included) accurate fashion.  The 
depiction of something in a frame of reference is indeed relative to a chosen 
origin and orientation, but not subject to occlusion or metric distortion.  We 
9
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should call it relative (relative to a frame of reference, or to this choice of 
origin and orientation) but not perspectival.
The standard style of geometric and kinematic representation in modern 
physics does not capture the appearances; it does faithfully replicate the primary 
qualities, the attributes of spatial and temporal extension  of the observable 
objects and processes.  Perspectival painting and drawing — or motion pictures, 
to add their recent continuation — on the other hand, not at all faithful to the 
shape of things, does capture how things appear in visual perspective.  
But science aims to save the appearances!  It follows therefore that we have 
not looked far enough yet into the scientific form of representation. 
How Copernicus saves the appearances
In the first book I set forth the entire distribution of the spheres 
together with the motions which I attribute to the earth, so 
that this book contains, as it were, the general structure of the 
universe.  Then in the remaining books I correlate the motions 
of the other planets and of all the spheres with the movement 
of the earth so that I may thereby determine to what extent 
the motions and appearances of the other planets and spheres 
Appearance vs. Reality as a Scientific Problem    43
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can be saved if they are correlated with the earth’s motions.
Copernicus, De Revolutionibus, Preface. 
The Ptolemaic system, concretely depicted by an armillary on a table top, 
represents the motions of the stars and planets in the frame of reference of the 
earth.  In contrast, Copernicus’ system of the world represents the motions of 
the stars and planets in the frame of reference of fixed stars, with the ‘mean sun’ 
as center.  But because Copernicus devised his system by a sort of ‘transcription’ 
of Ptolemy’s, he can point out that observations from the earth in his system 
will deliver the same data.13  
Consider what is utilized in this ‘pointing out’.  First of all, there is what the 
system represents directly, the postulated “general structure of the universe”. 
Secondly, there is the geometric optics, based on the postulate that unobstructed 
light travels in straight lines with infinite speed.  Thirdly — and here we make 
contact with the visual arts — the appearances to be saved are identified with 
the projections through a point on the earth of the celestial motions by those 
straight light-lines.    
The appearances, thus conceived, change with time.  There were no motion 
pictures, but of course one could construct a series of ‘stills’, and one could 
furthermore combine these into a single picture of a motion over time.  This is 
the birth of kinematics together with kinematic, as opposed to static geometric, 
representation.  The most striking illustration to Copernicus’ contemporaries 
was his new explanation of retrograde motion of the planets.  We can imagine 
traditional astronomers of the time telling him: 
but the planets sometimes reverse in their paths!  We can see 
with our own eyes that they change direction!   
(Today we still encounter this in astrology:  watch out for misfortunes in your 
love life when Venus is retrograde ....)  But Copernicus explains the apparent 
retrograde motion of an inferior planet such as Venus, by depicting how its 
motion  would look from a slower moving Earth also orbiting the sun.14 
Three-faceted representation
 
When frames of reference come into their own, we have eventually a 
three-level representation:  there is the world [1] as described in co-ordinate 
independent terms, then the world [2] as described in a given frame of reference 
(co-ordinatization), and finally the world [3] as it looks from  a given vantage 
point with specific orientation.  This division corresponds to three ostensibly 
different domains:
[1] Theoretically postulated reality
 — Micro structure, forces, fields 
11
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[2] The observable phenomena
— Macro objects, motions, … 
[3] The appearances
— Measurement outcomes, ‘how things look’ in 
observational context
The first form of representation admits of many of the second sort, and the 
second of many of the third sort.  
4.  Perspective as measurement
First of all, on the surface on which I am going to paint, I draw 
a rectangle of whatever size I want, which I regard as an open 
window through which the subject to be painted is to be seen.15  
Leon Battista Alberti wrote his mathematically sophisticated De Pictura in 
1435, marking the most salient change of style from Medieval to Renaissance 
paintings in the West, which had began with Giotto in the previous century. 
Alberti dedicated his work to Brunelleschi, whose famous “experiment” 
demonstrated the triumph of the perspectival technique.  The experiment was 
a demonstration to all who witnessed it that this new technique did indeed 
render its subjects precisely as they appear to us.  Brunelleschi painted the 
Florence Baptistry, but made a peeping hole in the painting.  A person standing 
precisely where the painter had stood, and looking through the peephole would 
see the Baptistry.  Then a mirror was inserted between painting and Baptistry, 
so that one would see the contents of the painting instead.  Behold!  With or 
without the mirror, the scene was the same.16 
 Giorgio Vasari’s Lives of the Artists about a century later yet proclaimed 
this style of painting to be the accurate and faithful portrayal of reality:
painting is nothing more than the simple portrayal of all things 
alive in nature by means of design and color as nature herself 
produces them.17  
Perspective in this sense – one point linear perspective –did not remain the 
artist’s domain.    For that this was in effect a method of measurement, with 
the drawing as measurement outcome, was clearly recognized upon more 
mathematically oriented reflection.  
Alberti’s technique was not  rigorously applied by painters (and most likely 
not by Brunelleschi to construct his demonstration piece), but on the other 
hand it was in accurate use important to architecture, technical drawing, and 
machine design.  Its basis was in effect a very careful and systematic form of 
Appearance vs. Reality as a Scientific Problem    45
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measurement, in which certain geometric features are faithfully captured on 
the picture plane.  This is explicitly recognized in Albrecht Duerer’s treatise, 
where the technique is presented in a part entitled Unterweysung der Messung 
— “Art of Measurement”, “Teaching of Measurement”.  The mathematically 
precise and practical character of this way of rendering the appearances was 
there shown through its possible mechanization — though of course some of 
the moving parts of the machines had to be human still.  The content of a 
visual perspective (with one eye closed, in fixed position) was thus shown to 
be identical with the content of a complex, technically advanced measurement 
outcome. 
Generalization to conditional perspective
  
Copernicus’ achievement illustrates another important point about how 
the appearances are derived from the postulated reality in the modern era. 
Physical theory has the resources to explain how a certain image of the heavens 
is produced, on  a given ‘window’ plane, by drawing on the Copernican system 
of the heavens plus geometric optics.  But this derivation can be  carried out 
as soon as the location and orientation of the plane plus the projection point 
(the “eye”) are specified.  It does not require the actual presence of an eye and 
canvas or window pane, camera or screen.  An appearance is derivable in this 
substantive sense for each location and orientation in the universe.
Leibniz made the appreciation of this point central to his system of 
metaphysics.  He added chiaroscuro to visual perspective so to speak, and son 
to lumière, not to mention all the other common and peculiar sensibles.  For 
each location, each orientation there, each specifiable ‘window’ and every 
degree of fuzziness, there is a specific monad.  This monad has as its intentional 
state a representation of the universe which is precisely the appearance of 
the universe from that vantage point to the extent that the monad’s specific 
‘sensory’ limitations allow.  
In the appreciation of what modern science promised — and largely delivered 
— we must generalize from actual measurement and actual painting in precisely 
the way Leibniz did in his Monadology.  For every triple consisting of a point 
in space,  an orientation, and a plane cutting that orientation,  there is a 
one-point linear perspective projecting the world onto that plane.   Its content 
is precisely what the content would be of a Duerer-type measurement there. 
We can think here literally of a painting with that content, or  abstractly of 
a (enormously complex) indexical proposition describing how the world is 
‘from here, now’.   We can also follow Leibniz by recognizing  every possible 
configuration of limits, thus delivering the very partial appearances that might 
be captured by any myopic sensorily deprived painter on a small canvas.  
These perspectives and the relations between them - - most especially 
46   Bas C. van Fraassen
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including what is invariant as we move from one to the other — is precisely 
the subject of projective geometry, initiated in the 17th century by Desargues, 
Pascal, and La Hire and eventually developed autonomously in the 19th.  This 
is a general study of appearances — which we will have occasion to explore 
further — with of course no attention to the question of whether or not there 
is anyone being appeared to or any receptacle capturing, displaying, or in any 
fashion representing the appearance.  
What are the philosophical morals to be drawn here?  On the one hand 
this sort of oblivion to human agency, so useful to formalization, should not 
tempt us to reify appearances as entities in themselves, belonging to a special 
realm of the universe’s furniture.  But on the other hand we should regard the 
space of appearances, defined by this formal discipline, as much a part of the 
scientific image of the world as is the theoretically postulated reality ‘behind’ 
the phenomena.
5.  The Strange Case of Quantum Mechanics
 
Let us now go back to the challenge posed by quantum mechanics.   Is 
this after all the science which definitively breaks with the demand that the 
Appearances are to be shown as produced in or ‘derived’ from the theoretically 
postulated Reality?  We have here, it is often said, the most successful theory in 
the history of science.  As far as prediction goes, the riches gained have been 
beyond the dreams of avarice….  But  this theory engendered intense debate 
about what it meant, and what it could mean for the future of physics, both 
in the scientific community and beyond.  The physicists at least did not lack 
for philosophical audacity.
I want to take up this question, taking into account what we can say now 
about measurement and theories.  The relevant appearances are the contents of 
measurement outcomes.  But the complaint about quantum theory is precisely 
that these outcome-contents are so difficult to reconcile with what the theory 
says about the object measured, the measurement apparatus, and the ‘pointer’ 
indications that we identify as outcomes. The differences are basically twofold:
— there is indeterminacy in the quantum theoretically 
described world, but nothing of that sort in the measurement 
outcomes;
— the outcomes are not predictable with certainty, not even in 
principle, yet the laws that govern the quantum theoretically 
described world are deterministic.
In response I would like to apply two of the insights emphasized so far:  what a 
measurement  shows is not how things are, but how they look in that measurement 
set-up, and  secondly, whether science satisfies the Appearance from Reality 
criterion (or must do so) is not at all to be taken for granted.
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The dilemma argument
Recall the Born Rule which tells us how to derive testable empirical predictions 
from hypotheses about the quantum mechanical state of a system.18   Rather 
than repeat it here, let’s just state what it does:
If observable A is measured on a system in a certain quantum 
state, then Born’s rule provides a recipe for  calculating the 
probability of each possible outcome.
By ‘observable’ is meant ‘measurable physical quantity’.  So mass, position, 
velocity, charge — these are all observables familiar already before, but present 
also in this new theory.  Born’s rule is added to the basic quantum theory.  That 
basic theory contains the new mathematical forms of representation of states 
and observables, and also the dynamical laws that apply to them.  
Does this full theory in principle allow for an explanation of how the 
Appearances are produced?  Let us consider what that would require.  The 
Appearances are the measurement outcomes.  If the explanation is going to 
be entirely in the language of the basic theory, then the terms ‘outcome’ and 
‘measurement’ must first be equated to certain quantum mechanical descriptions 
of the situation.  
How can this be done?  The measurement situation is one in which an 
Apparatus is properly coupled to an Object, for a measurement of a certain 
observable A.  Then ‘outcome’ must refer to a final quantum state of the 
Apparatus, and ‘measurement’ to the evolution of the quantum state of 
Apparatus+Object during the interaction.  Let us suppose that this is so.
At first blush there is certainly a problem.  If the Apparatus+Object is an 
isolated, closed system then the dynamical laws of quantum mechanics specify a 
deterministic evolution for its state. (The general form of the applicable law is 
the famous Schroedinger Equation. 19 )  What about the outcome, now equated 
with the final state of the Apparatus?  Although quantum theory is ‘holistic’, and 
there are subtle relations between the whole and the parts, there is in fact in the 
quantum theory a standard rule to specify the ‘reduced’ state of the apparatus, 
on the basis of the state of the composite system of Apparatus+Object.20   This 
rule, we must emphasize, does not tell us that the apparatus’ final state is one 
of a bunch of possibles, unknown but with some probability.  On the contrary, 
it assigns a single quantum state to the apparatus.21 
Looked at in this way, the dynamics provided by the theory is telling the 
whole story.    And it is a deterministic story!   What has happened to the 
Born probabilities?  Surely they indicate an indeterminism in nature, since 
they only rarely give us certainty. 
This situation is often illustrated with Schroedinger’s famous thought 
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experiment of a  cat in a hellish contrivance, in which it dies if a photon goes 
through a half-silvered mirror, and survives if the photon is reflected.   The 
Born probability that the cat will survive is 0.5.  For the cat is in effect the 
measuring apparatus, and the photon the object being measured — the possible 
outcomes are the cat dead, and the cat alive.  Hence the ‘pointer observable’ 
is the one pertaining to the cat with possible values ‘dead’ and ‘alive’.  But if 
this contrivance is isolated, and Schroedinger’s Equation thus applies, then the 
whole system Cat+(Remainder of the contrivance)  evolves deterministically 
throughout, and the final quantum states of Cat and Remainder respectively 
are certainly not eigenstates of the respective observables.   There appears to 
be a contradiction.22 
We have arrived at an apparent contradiction between determinism in the 
central part of the theory, and the indeterminism that appears in the prediction 
of measurement outcomes.
A radical response
Nils Bohr insisted that measurement and outcome be described in “classical” 
language.  So he assert that our supposition, in the preceding argument, is 
mistaken.  The terms ‘outcome’ and ‘measurement’ cannot be equated to 
any quantum mechanical descriptions of the situation.  They must have an 
independent meaning or reference.  That is part of the original Copenhagen 
Interpretation of the quantum theory.  (Today it is also popular in the very 
lively information theoretic approach.23 )
On such an interpretation, the most basic necessary condition for satisfying 
the Appearance from Reality Criterion is not met.  
But quantum mechanics has been supplemented by quite a number of 
different interpretations.  Despite the authority and influence of the Copenhagen 
interpretation we cannot simply base a philosophical conclusion on what it 
implies.
Outside the dilemma
The argument we just went through does not leave any logical leeway at 
all.  But an argument has premises, and premises can be denied.  From the 
very beginning two options were taken seriously:  that either a modification 
or a supplementation could lead to an empirically equivalent theory in which 
the outcomes and measurements are identified in that theory’s own terms.24  
‘Empirically equivalent’ means here that the Born probabilities come out as 
correct in the new theory as well, conditional on the information contained 
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in the original quantum state of the Apparatus+Object set-up. What is the 
difference here between modification and supplementation?  
•	 When	the	theory	is	modified	and	not	supplemented,	the	dynamical	
laws become indeterministic.  
•	 If	 the	 theory	 is	 not	modified	but	 only	 supplemented,	 the	 outcome	
supervenes on the quantum state plus some hidden variables, which 
do not change the empirical predictions.  
But if any of these efforts is successful in what it sets out to do, is the Appearance 
from Reality Criterion satisfied?  That we cannot say beforehand at all.  We 
need to take a look at them specifically.25   
Episode One: is there a ‘collapse’?
Johann von Neumann was the first to take the bull by the horns, in his 1932 
monograph.  He identified the outcome of a measurement in a straightforward 
way with the final state of the measured object.  To explain the details, to the 
extent that they concern us here, we need only to add one technical notion. 
Some states are called eigenstates of an observable, associated with specific 
values that the observable can have.  According to the Born rule, these are 
precisely the states in which the corresponding value will be found with certainty.
The Born rule, as interpreted by von Neumann,  is then read as follows:
The outcome is r precisely if the object’s  initial state Ψ   
      changes to the r-eigenstate of observable A.
That this will happen has probability  (|r>. Ψ)2  
The apparatus’ state at the end is the corresponding 
eigenstate        of its own “pointer” observable.
 
This reading has a principle behind it, what we now call the 
Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link:  observable A pertaining to 
system X has value r if and only if X is in the r-eigenstate of 
observable A.
Von Neumann was quite right to think that he had to answer the questions 
to which these points are addressed.  
When probabilities are calculated from the quantum state, 
we        must ask “probabilities of what?”   
When it is asserted that an observable can have different  
      values, we must ask “what is it for an observable to have 
a        value?”  
Von Neumann asked those questions and provided answers framed entirely in 
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quantum mechanical terms.  He answered the first by saying that the probability 
in question was the probability of a change of state.  And the second he answered 
by the principle that the observable has a given value precisely if the system 
in question is in the relevant eigenstate of that observable.
Von Neumann’s indeterminism
But Von Neumann’s answer implies that the quantum state of the 
Apparatus+Object does not evolve deterministically.  There is a “collapse of 
the wave packet”, a discontinuous and not completely predictable change of the 
state into one of the observable’s eigenstates.  (This is also called his “Projection 
Postulate”.)  This physical change during or at the end of the measurement 
process actually violates the dynamical laws that govern isolated, closed systems. 
We could try to rationalize this by suggesting  that the strange changes happen 
only in parts of the total system, not to the whole.  That would say in effect: 
the Apparatus+Object may be a closed, isolated system to 
which the dynamic laws apply without exception, but its 
parts may have to some extent an autonomous status.  Certain 
properties of the parts’ states are not entirely determined by the 
state of the whole, and occur spontaneously, with irreducible 
probabilities.  The measurement outcome — the Appearance 
we are interested in!  — is constituted precisely by those 
undetermined properties that yield the measurement outcome.  
If this is tenable at all, it certainly implies a violation of the Appearance from 
Reality Criterion.  For consistency is preserved here (if it is) by explicitly 
disavowing even the deduction, let alone explanation, of the Appearance.26 
 There is another alternative:  the Born rule, understood as by von 
Neumann, must pertain to some relation which the Apparatus+Object has 
to something outside of that.  What is that relation?  One answer stands out, 
as undoubtedly the most waved about idea in the history of the subject: that 
something is the observer.  
Eugene Wigner:  the peculiar effects of observation
Is the moon not really there when we are not looking?  No, 
it is not.  Has Schroedinger’s cat either died or survived until 
and unless we open the infernal machine, to see what state it is 
in?   No, neither of these!  What about us, the observers, then?  
Are we there when no one is looking?  In fact we observers 
are always observed, namely  by ourselves.  
Eugene Wigner famously argued that quantum mechanics requires this sort 
of interpretation.  A measurement is not an event completely describable in 
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physics, it must include consciousness, a mind-body interaction.27   
 I don’t want to discuss the virtues and vices of this sort of approach 
— let’s just assume that it can be made consistently.  The question for us here 
is just this:  
if this is accepted, do we have an explanation of how the 
Appearances — the measurement outcomes — are produced?  
Unfortunately Wigner’s account only looks like it provides such an explanation. 
His thesis amounts to the assertion that there is an explanation of the collapse, 
an explanation which if given would display a mechanism of production.  But 
to assert that there is one does not amount to giving one!  The criterion of 
Appearance from Reality is not satisfied by science if we simply add the postulate 
that it is satisfied in some way by something non-physical.
Moreover, with a crucial term imported from outside physics, and no further 
account of that term, it actually provides no clue at all to how the Appearances 
thus derive from the Reality. Hence we must read Wigner’s proposal as involving 
the view that the Appearance from Reality Criterion is not a demand to be 
satisfied by physics.28  
The Appearances are as if ...
These early discussions are illuminating not only because they begin to chart 
our range of options, but also because they were closely related to practice. 
Whatever the theoretical status of ‘collapse’, the way the working physicist 
calculates does always assume that the Appearances will be at least as if states 
thus collapse in measurement.  The Born Rule is not genuinely explained that 
way, but certainly most easily conveyed in practice.  Almost every textbook 
asserted that upon measurement the object will be in one of the eigenstates 
of the measured observable, with given probability.29  The Appearances are as 
if von Neumann’s Projection Postulate is true.  Given the various impasses 
we have now reached, we need to think of how these Appearances could be 
saved without requiring the kind of completeness the classical mindset desires.
Episode Two: the appearances yoked unto a forbearing reality
There is a radical alternative to what von Neumann proposed:  to take 
quantum mechanics to be incomplete in its depiction of the physical world. 
If it is incomplete then there is a more complete such depiction, in principle; 
the new ingredients therein are called “hidden variables”.  These ingredients 
may or may not be hidden from our view; they are hidden in only in the sense 
that they do not appear in the quantum state.  
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Interpretations and hidden variables
We must carefully distinguish here between interpretations of the theory 
and rivals.  Any implication of different empirical predictions makes for a 
rival theory — an interpretation does not do that.  So if an interpretation adds 
hidden variables, those variables are “empirically superfluous”.  Nevertheless, 
the question of whether it is possible to explain how the Appearances are 
produced might conceivably be answerable on the basis of a combination of 
the quantum state plus those hidden variables, empirically superfluous or not. 
After all that question asks not for a prediction but for an explanation.
If that is possible, will the Appearance from Reality criterion be back in 
its previously supposed status, as a demand on the scientific enterprise?  Not 
necessarily!  That will depend on whether, given this possibility, it is incumbent 
on physics to extend quantum mechanics by the addition of such hidden 
variables.  The practically universal reaction in the physics community has 
been that it is not.30     
But if the hidden variables are innocuous enough it may be possible to 
recast their introduction as a gloss on or reading of the equally prevalent use 
of the terms “measurement” and “outcome” in scientific practice — despite 
their apparent irreducibility to purely quantum mechanical description.  I see 
this hunch as behind the recurrent  attempts to depict quantum mechanics 
as “perspectival”.  This is what I want to explore here — with the hope or 
speculation that we may be able to remain in the Copenhagen spirit without 
feeling forced back upon the choice between empirical collapse postulates on 
the one hand and the increasingly strange metaphysics that are now so often 
invoked.
So I turn finally to a class of interpretations that clearly reject the Appearance 
from Reality criterion.  
Modal interpretation: the elements
 In his recent book Interpreting the Quantum World,  Jeffrey Bub displays 
a very large class of interpretations under the heading of modal interpretations 
in a general sense.  Besides some that have actually been called by that name 
he displays Bohm’s interpretation as belonging to this.  My own favorite, the 
Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation (CVMI) does not belong 
to the precise class he defines, but fits on a somewhat wider definition that I’ll 
take for granted here.31   
 On a modal interpretation there is an important separation between 
states and observables.  Their mathematical representatives remain the same. 
However, an observable (that is, a physical quantity) can have a determinate 
value even if the quantum state does not make it so.32   An observable can 
have different values in systems which are in the same quantum state.  Von 
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Neumann’s basic Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link is rejected.  Attribution of values 
to observables is not equated with attribution of  a quantum state.  
 At the end of the measurement, the “pointer” of the apparatus indicates, 
say, the number 17.  That means now that the “pointer” observable pertaining 
to this apparatus has value 17.  It does not imply that the quantum state of the 
apparatus is an eigenstate of that observable.  Similarly the measured observable 
A, pertaining to the object measured, may now have value 17, though the 
object is not in the 17-eigenstate of A.
 Part of the linkage is preserved:  A cannot have value 17 if the object is in 
the 18-eigenstate of A,  for example.  In that case A does have value 18.  But 
if the object is in a mixed state, of which both those states occur with positive 
weight, then A may have value 17 or perhaps value 18.  Which  value does 
A have then?  The whole point is that the quantum state does not determine 
that.  This is where the quantum world’s indeterminism appears.  The Born 
rule fills a gap here: it tells us that if this situation is indeed the end state of  a 
certain measurement then there is a definite calculable probability that A has 
value 17.  
 On this interpretation a physical system’s condition at a given moment 
has two constituents:  its quantum state and a function that assigns values to 
observables pertaining to it.  That function is also a sort of state; call it  the 
value state (sometimes also called the ‘property state’).  That is, formally 
speaking, the hidden variable.  Given that we are dealing with an interpretation 
here and not a rival theory, it follows that this hidden variable is empirically 
superfluous.  
 But as these modal interpretations were originally presented, the value 
state does represent a real characteristic of the physical system, omitted from 
its quantum mechanical characterization.  Are we stuck with this way of 
understanding them?
Modal interpretation, perspectivally
 Let us try out the following view instead:  the value state is not a separate 
aspect of the real situation; it is not the case that a system has two sorts of 
physical states.  Rather what is called the value state or property state is the 
content of a perspective on the system — a perspective of a (possible) measurer 
or viewer.
 The pointer is really at the “17”, the cat is really dead inside the box 
– although the quantum state does not make it so, that is their status in 
possible or actual measurement outcome.  But remember:  what appears in 
a measurement is now how the object is but how it looks.  That the pointer 
observable has value 17: that means that in this measurement, observable A’s 
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having value 17 is how the object looks.  The cat looks dead — is it dead?  As 
long as cat and apparatus remain in a thoroughly entangled state the cat can 
look dead or look alive.  The cat’s role in Schroedinger’s hellish contrivance 
is that of a measuring apparatus (the measurement being performed on the 
photon).  Its ‘pointer observable’ is the observable with values ‘dead’ and 
‘alive’.  The measurement outcome could have as content one or the other, 
these are different perspectival ‘takes’ on the photon’s state.  If the two — Cat 
and Remainder of the contrivance — are  disentangled (if through interaction 
with the environment the situation ‘decoheres’) this ambiguity in the facts 
will cease.33   
 Remember also that we must think in the ways of Leibniz’s monadology 
here.  There aren’t measurement apparatus located at every point, but the 
theory implies conditional perspectival looks as well.  In the case of visual 
perspectives as treated in projective geometry, we also think of every point 
and orientation determining a perspective, regardless of whether there is a thus 
oriented measurement apparatus or viewer present at that point.  Think of it 
here in the same way.  The appearances are the contents of possible as well as 
actual measurement outcomes.34   Unlike in the classical case, the conditional 
perspectival looks cannot be jointly realized for all observables at once, however.
  The measurement outcomes, these are the Appearances to be 
saved! They are saved in that the interpretation makes room for them in the 
theoretical world picture.  But they are saved in a way that explicitly rejects 
their derivability from the quantum state.   (In fact, this interpretation does 
not even yield supervenience on the quantum state:  for two systems in the 
same quantum state may have different value states.)
 What are the Appearances like, on these modal interpretations?  We do 
see quite some variation there.  I will illustrate with two of them, one favored 
by Bub and one that I still favor.35   
‘Single perspective’ variant of modal interpretation
 Bub’s interpretation implies that the actual state of the world is characterized 
by the definiteness of a single ‘privileged’ observable.  One example could of 
course be position: then everything in the world could have a precise location.36  
 In quantum theory not all observables are mutually compatible.  Whatever 
observable has this privileged status will preclude many other observables from 
having any definite value at all.  Some other such observable could have this 
privileged status instead, and then the objects in the world would not have 
definite locations. 
 On Bub’s view we can think of his world as follows.  The world is a system 
which has a quantum state and, in addition there is a privileged observable 
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which has a definite value.  So it is  just as if that observable had just been 
measured on the world, with a collapse precipitated by that measurement.  In 
that sense we see that von Neumann’s collapse — and the usual practice that 
seems to instantiate von Neumann’s interpretation — are reflected here.  The 
Appearances are indeed just as if certain measurements have projected the 
measured objects — indeed, all objects! — into an eigenstate of a particular 
maximal observable.
 Can we understand this interpretation perspectivally?  I think so.  For each 
quantum mechanical model of the world, there are many models in which 
the quantum states there assigned are supplemented with value states.  Let 
us call the latter the associated interpreting models.  This supplementation 
is systematic:  a single observable has the privileged status that it has definite 
values, and values are distributed to other observables derivatively from the 
privileged one, if at all.  
 This is how, according to von Neumann, the world would look in one of 
the possible outcomes of a measurement of the privileged observable.  What 
is dropped from von Neumann’s interpretation is the postulate that this look 
comes from a real change in the world’s state.  Giving up on the idea that 
the theory is responsible for specifying some physical process by which that 
appearance is produced, we have left that this is the way the world appears. 
For each such possible look, compatible in Bub’s specified way with the given 
quantum mechanical model, there is  such an interpretative model.  These 
interpretative models therefore constitute the manifold of possible perspectives 
on the world.  
 This manifold of perspectives is entailed by the quantum theory, just as the 
manifold of contents of possible perspectives on the world is entailed in classical 
physics.  Well, not precisely “just as”:  the means for deriving the appearances 
from the state of the world plus the origin, orientation, and ‘picture plane’ of 
the  measurement set-up is lacking in the quantum theory.  
 But that rejection of the Appearance from Reality Criterion is precisely 
the option under which modal interpretations are developed.
 ‘Windowing’:  a different style of painting
 Before turning to an alternative, in which the world is depicted as subject of 
many perspectives at once — in some sort of harmony!  — I need to introduce 
you to a bit more history of perspective.
  The fact is that Vasari was quite wrong when he wrote “ painting is 
nothing more than the simple portrayal of all things alive in nature ... as nature 
herself produces them.”37   A quick look at modern paintings might suggest that 
from the Renaissance till the 1880’s (with Cézanne’s perspective  sabotaging 
still-lives) obedience to the structure of one-point linear perspective was a 
categorical imperative. But that is a mistake practically throughout.  The 
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lesson that we can see applied in practice was that “realistic” representation 
is achieved through distortion — but careful, systematic distortion, even 
perspectival distortion.
 We do not experience the visible world as if we are statically placed with 
one eye behind a peephole.  There is a good deal of literature now that corrects 
the simplistic story of Renaissance painters slowly learning how to get it right. 
While drawing on the geometric perspectival constructions, the painters did 
not find them artistically adequate.  They modified the construction to make 
it more ‘perceptually acceptable’ — but also exploited violations of perspective 
to shape the viewers’ experience of the religious and spiritual content.38   The 
artistic representation is not a geometric projection of its subject — it is to be 
created so that it looks right to the observer.  
 As an example let’s take this painting from the Northern Renaissance, 
Dirk Bouts’ Last Supper in Leuven.   Views of this painting are easily available 
now on the internet.39 
 At first sight this is a textbook example of perspectival drawing.40   But on 
second look it is not:  when you look at each face, or the chandelier, individually, 
you find that you are seeing it from a point at its own height.  Hence the scene 
is not painted as seen from a single vantage point.  Indeed, it is painted as if 
we have for each object a specific perspective, from a point aligned specially 
for that object.  Why then does it give it initial impression that the painter 
rendered faithfully just what a viewer would see when entering the room? 
Because we are mobile creatures, and our mobility is so deeply integrated into 
our imagination that the mind’s eye moves, so to speak, even when the body 
does not.  
This technique, beautifully and thoroughly explored in the artist David 
Hockney’s book Secret Knowledge, is called windowing.  It is a clear violation 
of the technique that Brunelleschi demonstrated, and this degree of violation 
is actually found in modern visual art from the earliest days.41   It has of course 
been suggested that the Northern Renaissance painters were not as sophisticated 
yet as Alberti and his compatriots, and that this could account for deviations 
from perspectival painting.  Even if that is so, however — not very plausible, 
since the effects created are dramatically effective in part because of those 
deviations —  there are ample instances of windowing in later paintings, 
sufficient to make the point.42 
The appearances to the observer do not derive from the reality by single 
geometric projection.  Is that relevant to science?  I have located perspectival 
drawing under the heading of measurement – as Duerer did – and will even hold 
it up as a paradigm case. So there is no immediate application: a measurement 
apparatus does not add imagined movement into its data registry in the way of a 
human viewer of Bouts’ painting.  Nor does the correlation of measurement results 
at different moments, as for example by Einstein’s imaginary train conductors, 
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violate perspective in that way.  Bouts’ windowing places appearances that 
would be consequent on movement all in the same plane as if simultaneously 
projected — as if distinct frames from a movie were combined into a still, but 
with such skill that it deceives the eye.
 However, when it comes to a theory which subverts still more of our 
common sense concepts than classical or relativity physics, Bouts may offer us 
new inspiration.  So now let us look at something quite close to Bub’s rendition 
of the quantum world, but with greater perspectival complexity.
‘Windowing’:  the Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation
 My own favored interpretation, the Copenhagen Variant of the Modal 
Interpretation  (CVMI), relates to Bub’s family of modal interpretations more or 
less as windowing does to one-point perspective.43   There is no simple privileged 
observable.  But it is as if the Ignorance Interpretation of  Mixtures is correct, 
for every object in the world has a ‘value state’ that is pure.  These value states 
are related to the quantum states and to measurement processes (quantum 
mechanically defined) so that in consequence it is also as if von Neumann’s 
Projection Postulate is true.  Again the ‘as if ’ describes the Appearances, that 
is, the value states (the contents of possible measurement outcomes) but not 
the quantum state.
Why do I say that this is like ‘windowing’ rather than like one-point 
perspective?  These value states are the contents of specific perspectives on 
those objects — of conditional perspectives, of course, with the assignments 
subject to constraints that harmonizes them into a single beautiful world of 
appearance.   Here the quantum world does not look as one would expect if 
the ‘collapse’ idea had been right and the world had just been subjected to 
great single comprehensive measurement.44    Rather, in  a CVMI model 
every object, including every part of an object, ‘looks’ as if it has just been 
individually projected into some pure state.  Thus it is possible for both the 
whole and the parts to be definite in their Apparent characteristics.  The 
Appearances thus assigned are as if each object in the world is seen individually 
from some specific measuring vantage point.  
The structure of appearance
On this view, what is the world like?  We restrict ourselves here to elementary 
quantum theory.  The world consists of things that however, as Bohr said, resist 
description consonant with the older ideas of causality and locality:
the renunciation of the ideal of causality in atomic physics 
which has been forced on us is founded logically only on our 
not being any longer in a position to speak of the autonomous 
behavior of a physical object.”45 
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But these objects each have a quantum state (dynamical state); they are often 
compound, and then their parts all have quantum states too.  The quantum 
state of an isolated system develops in time in accordance with the Schroedinger 
equation, that is, deterministically.  The states of their parts evolve too, in a way 
directly derivative from the evolution of the whole.  All of this applies equally 
well to those cases in which one part of a system is a measuring apparatus in 
appropriate interaction with another part.
 But besides these physical states that are the subject of dynamics, there are 
the appearances of these very things in possible determinate measurement set-
ups.  These appearances are described in the same language as the dynamical 
states.  (Note that, in our more ordinary context, we describe the shape of a 
table as it appears in a photo in the same language as we describe its shape 
simpliciter!)  They can be described as value states or property states, represented 
by vectors in the same Hilbert space that represent the pure quantum states. 
In actual measurement, these value states are what appear in the measurement 
outcomes.  
 6.  The Final Challenge
 
The details of quantum theory interpretation are fascinating, 
challenging, and frustrating, and its problems are by no means all settled.  But 
my main aim in this paper is not to defend a specific interpretation — let alone 
its details in one form or another! Rather, what I mean to do is to argue that it 
is perfectly scientific, and scientifically acceptable, to reject the completeness 
criterion for science that has had such a grip on the modern philosophical 
imagination.  That is a point concerning the aim and methodology of science, 
directed against at least certain traditional themes in ‘realist’ philosophies of 
science.
  As I see it, the recent history of science should convince us that this 
is so.  The Copenhagen physicists were acting in a way that counted as real 
physics when they introduced and developed quite explicitly a theory and an 
interpretation incompatible with the Appearance from Reality completeness 
criterion.  Therefore that criterion is not a constraint on the sciences.46   It is, 
in that case, just another of those philosophically or metaphysically motivated 
imperatives that could hamper science if they were obeyed, and though  they 
receive much lip service,  are anyway quickly flouted  when that hampering is 
felt. 
Princeton University
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Notes
1   Pino, Dialogo di pittura, (1548) IX; cited Gopnik, page 99; see further 
Gopnik pp. 95-102 on how Leonardo da Vinci and his contemporaries saw 
the relation between the sciences and the visual arts.
2   As Leibniz made explicit, logically necessary connections may not be finitary, 
may in fact be inaccessible to any finite mind — (therefore not within even 
the potential reach of the physical sciences).  Notice that we have here 
perhaps the first ‘supervenience without reduction’ claim, for reduction 
would require finitary reasoning but the demonstrative link is claimed to be 
non-finitary. I will return to questions of supervenience below.
3   That would be a minimal requirement — in fact the one that Cardinal 
Bellarmini suggested to Galileo as solely relevant.
4   Leplin, p. 15.  See further e.g. page 80.
5   For simplicity of exposition I assume that A is discrete and not degenerate: 
there is a single unit eigenvector for each eigenvalue, and the possible values 
constitute a countable set of eigenvalues.
6  Cf. U.T. Place (1956).
7   See further the similar position by David Armstrong in Armstrong and 
Malcolm,and his A Materialist Theory of Mind.
8   As a metaphysical postulate this supervenience claim presumably gives 
some emotional comfort to the materialist.  While science is here admitted 
to be incapable of showing this, the world is still how the materialist would 
like it to be.
9   Cf. Grua, 303, quoted by Mates, 108-109.  For this part, and for these references, 
I am thoroughly indebted to Anja Jauernig’s dissertation (Princeton 2003). 
10   If we leave modal metaphysics aside, then the best way to think of 
supervenience of one sort of description on another is that the one cannot 
be translated into the other sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph, 
or even recursively specifiable set by set, etc. but there is a translation 
nevertheless in the abstract sense of an equivalence set by set which is not 
definable by mathematical or logical means.  See the relevant section of 
my  “Transcendence of the Ego ...”.
11   In fact, this drawing is in one-point perspective, which is definitely not 
what a pin-hole camera would capture; it is still quite artificial with respect 
to the actual content of a visual perspective, where there is much marginal 
distortion. 
12   Such limiting features are crucial to the distinction between visual picturing 
and other modes of representation; see Lopes (1996, Ch. 6).  
13   This makes the point I want to make simple.  The entire discussion of 
modern science that follows here, before we return to quantum theory, 
could be more informatively developed around e.g. Newton’s system of the 
world — but I think we would lose the forest for the trees.
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14  See e.g. I. Bernard Cohen, page 39, figure 10.
15  Alberti, tr. Grayson 1972;  1991 Penguin edition page 54.
16  See e.g. Zajonc, page 60.
17   Giorgio Vasari, Le Vite de’ più eccellenti pittori, scultori ed architettori,(1550) 
ed. Gaetano Milanesi (Florence  1878-85), II, 288; cited in Gombrich, 
page12.
18   For simplicity of exposition I assume that A is discrete and not degenerate: 
there is a single unit eigenvector for each eigenvalue, and the possible 
values constitute a countable set of eigenvalues.
19   The interaction must be governed by a suitable Hamiltonian, to satisfy the 
requirements for measurement.  Schroedinger’s equation then shows how 
the Apparatus+Object state evolves deterministically throughout the time 
interval in which this system is isolated.
20   This rule, reduction of the density matrix, assigns to the Apparatus the unique 
state such that the Born probabilities for any observable B pertaining to the 
Apparatus alone equal those for the observable B⊗I on Apparatus+Object, 
where I is the trivial ‘identity’ observable on the Object.   
21   This has not always been clear, since the final state calculated directly 
shows the measured object to be in a mixture of eigenstates of A at the 
end of the process.  It is tempting to think that this means that it is then 
really in one of those eigenstates, we don’t know which, with the mixing 
coeffients constituting a probability measure of our ignorance.  Reichenbach 
pointed out in the 1940s that this “ignorance interpretation” of mixtures 
would dissolve the quantum mechanical paradoxes and the measurement 
problem.  But as has been recurrently pointed out in the literature since 
then, this interpretation of mixed states is not tenable for objects united 
in an entangled state.
22   The final state of the cat in this scenario (before the box is opened) is a 
mixture of the ‘dead’ and ‘alive’ eigenstates.  In early discussions it was 
sometimes suggested that to be in a mixture of two states is just to be in 
one of them, with some probability for each  —see previous note:  that 
is not a tenable interpretation here since Cat and Remainder are indeed 
united in an ‘entangled’ state.
23   Jeffrey Bub, “Why the quantum?”, ms. 2003, abstract: “assuming the 
information-theoretic constraints are in fact satisfied in our world, no 
mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of 
measurement interactions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of 
physics at the fundamental level then becomes the representation and 
manipulation of information.”
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24   There are of course also in this neighborhood rivals to the quantum theory 
which imply different empirical predictions — and we must distinguish 
those from attempts at interpretation.
25   It may help if we start first by listing the various alternatives, if premises 
of the above argument are to be denied.
 ALT1.   The terms ‘outcome’ and ‘measurement’ are not to be equated 
with aspects of the quantum-mechanically described physical 
situation.  
 ALT2.   The dynamical laws for an isolated, closed system are to be 
modified, so as to let in some stochastic element.
 ALT3.   The Born rule does not pertain to an isolated, closed system, 
so the dynamical laws of quantum mechanics do not apply 
directly.
 ALT4.   The ‘standard rule’ which assigns a state to the Apparatus, 
on the basis of the state of Apparatus+Object, is either not 
applicable here or gives incomplete  information about the 
parts of the total system. 
       All these alternatives have been pursued; that is why the theory has so 
many different interpretations.
26   This solution also preserves supervenience of the outcome on the quantum state; 
in fact the outcome is a quantum state.  What is relinguished is the possibility 
of explaining how the quantum states of the  two parts come about — the 
dynamical laws governing evolution of the system as a whole give no clue to 
it.  But we should note also that the standard treatment of composition and 
reduction of states in compound systems is not so easily given up or modified! 
But the difficulties for this idea are not so relevant here, given that our sole 
interest is in the implications for the Appearance from Reality criterion.
27   Imagine Schroedinger’s dismay — he wrote “ For it must have given to de 
Broglie the same shock and disappointment as it gave to me, when we learnt 
that a sort of transcendental, almost psychical interpretation of the wave 
phenomenon had been put forward, which was very soon hailed by the majority 
of leading theorists as the only one reconcilable with experiments, and which 
has now become the orthodox creed, accepted by almost everybody, with 
a few notable exceptions.” (“The meaning of wave mechanics”, page 16.)
28   The ‘decoherence’ approach to measurement is often mentioned as perhaps 
doing with a physical environment, in which the measurement is not 
isolated, what Wigner tried to do with consciousness.While decoherence 
is an important and arguably indispensable feature  in a real measurement, 
it is generally acknowledged now that this insight does not solve or remove 
the measurement problem. There is only one move that I am omitting 
now in this discussion:  to say that there is no such system as the whole 
universe — every physical system is an “open” system.
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29   As David Albert has forcefully pointed out, the collapse postulate changes 
the predictions of the theory.  For there is a definable quantity pertaining 
to the system as a whole (box with Cat etc. inside) for which measurement 
outcome probabilities are certainly different, depending on whether there 
was a collapse.    ‘Recombination’ experiments furnish today the most 
psychologically compelling support for rejecting collapse, but in my view 
Albert’s point is already a solid reason if we are concerned to have an 
interpretation, without affecting the empirical content.  
30   I have to add here too that within an empiricist stance there is absolutely 
no interest in the question whether quantum mechanics is true under one 
interpretation or another.  In fact, whether there is anything true in the 
theory beyond what it implies for the observable phenomena is irrelevant 
to the basic criterion of success in science.  But to understand  a theory  in 
physics we need to look into what it says beyond that, and the many ways 
in which what it said can be interpreted.   Understanding the theory, to a 
certain extent, is crucial for us here if we are to appreciate the Copenhagen 
revolutionary challenge to traditionally proclaimed  values and ideals. 
31   See my Review of Bub, Interpreting the Quantum World.
32   (p.178) This class of interpretations include Bohm’s interpretation, Bub’s 
own, versions of Bohr, Kochen, and many others, though it does not in 
fact include all modal interpretations — see my review of his book.  The 
Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation, which I shall discuss 
below, is not included, but shares the features I am outlining here.
33   Actually, more accurately, the ambiguity will almost cease; we are in the 
world of quantum mechanics — Dorothy, we are not in Kansas any more ....
34   This must be read very carefully.  All those measurement outcome contents 
must cohere together in a certain way, so that they can be thought of as 
all perspectives on a single world in some specific quantum state.  In just 
the same way, the entire set of contents of visual perspectives, with origins 
in both possible and actual viewers, in a given room for example, must 
cohere so that they can be regarded as being “of” the same room.   In the 
case of the modal interpretations I am discussing, the delineation of what 
the joint value states can be of the parts of a compound system, given a 
quantum state for the whole, is directed to this point.
35   Although Bub lists it as one of the interpretations covered in his framework, 
I am not going to take up Bohmian mechanics here.  Bohm allows only one 
parameter to have a definite value – always the same one, always definite – 
namely position.  This world is one of particles that are always somewhere 
– and larger objects ‘made up’ of those particles, always in a precise spatial 
region. Their motions are continuous in time.  This view may have been 
inspired by the extreme operationalist idea, going back to Mach, that in 
the last analysis every measurement is a length measurement.  (Not very 
Appearance vs. Reality as a Scientific Problem    65
32
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 35 [2005], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol35/iss1/3
6 x 9
plausible:  could you describe even a length measurement operation using 
only predicates denoting lengths?) Or perhaps it derives even further 
back from Descartes’ dream of a world whose only objective properties are 
attributes of extension.  That the phenomena are saved in a weak sense 
only and that there is still an Appearance/Reality gap here is argued in 
my “Interpretation of QM: Parallels and Choices”,  as well as in papers by 
Abe Stone and Katherine Bedard.
36   This is characteristic of Bohm’s interpretation, which was given new life 
for a while by a number of writers in recent decades.
37   Cf. Joseph Margolis in Babich (ed.), page 234:  “Brunelleschi had isolated the 
unique circumstance in which the artificial perspective of two-dimensional 
representations of natural space coincides with natural perspective  [...]  The 
artist is always obliged to reconcile, wherever he has an interest in perspectival 
realism, the demands of realism (as they are understood in his own age) and 
the demands of the visual coherence of  its pictorial representation viewed 
as a picture.  The decisive factor is this:  the normal viewer of a painting 
changes his point of view while scanning the picture before him; he is not 
confined to anything like a Brunelleschian peephole .....”
38   See for example Kubovy (1986).  This book engages well with the history 
and philosophy of art and demonstrates how already in the Renaissance 
painters violated perspective in various ways, to a good purpose, and with 
good psychological rationale.  
39   See http://www.abcgallery.com/B/bouts/bouts3.html.
40   The classic analysis of perspective in Renaissance art appears in Erwin 
Panovsky’s Perspective as Symbolic Form who writes “the perspective 
of Eyckian pictures is, from a purely mathematical point of view, still 
“incorrect”; for the orthogonals, although they may converge to a single 
point within an entire plane, do not so converge within the entire space .... 
This latter convergence seems rather to have been arrived at first by Dirk 
Bouts” (page 61), illustrating his point with a schematic depiction of Bouts’ 
Last Supper.  One critic’s entry on this painting reads: “The real novelty of 
this extraordinary painting lies in its systematic application of the laws of 
perspective. Jan Van Eyck and Rogier Van der Weyden had already used 
perspective, but only in interior scenes that were much simpler than this Last 
Supper. They had done nothing as complex or as perfect as the architecture 
of this central room.” (The Web Gallery of Art  http://gallery.euroweb.hu) 
See also Pauwels,  Aimé and Henri (1998) whose analysis of perspective 
in this painting is also available on the web at http://users.pandora.be/
aime.pauwels/Bouts.engels.html.  Panovsky does point out (notes 53 and 
60) that the Northern Renaissance painters used ‘empirical’ methods to 
construct perspective, inferior to the geometric theory codified by Alberti, 
but does not discuss whether e.g. Bouts’ painting remains perspectival at 
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the level of detail.  The contrary conclusions that I am reporting on here 
are to be found and demonstrated in David Hockney’s Secret Knowledge. 
These conclusions are quite independent of his much disputed historical 
speculations — see e.g. Lawrence Weschler.
41   True, the violations starting in the 1880s are more drastic.  Bouts knew how 
to combine the ‘windowed’ scenes so as to create a “realistic” appearance 
through distortion of this sort. Cézanne rejects the imperative to create a 
“realistic” appearance in that sense.  This successors went farther, though 
largely in order to create a greater realism at other levels.  .See further 
Steven French’s forthcoming paper from PSA 2002
42   See David Hockney’s Secret Knowledge, pages 99-121, and for additional 
forms of ‘faithful distorting’, pages 172-179. 
43   See my review of Bub for an explanation of how it is related to, but does 
not fall in, the class described in his book.  A complete exposition can be 
found in my Quantum Mechanics. 
44   For in the CVMI the Appearance of a composite system matches its Reality 
if that system is already in a pure quantum state.  In that case it could not be 
the result of a projection which also projects its components into pure state. 
45   Nils Bohr, “Causality and complementarity”, cited in Grunbaum 1957, 
page 722.
46   Note also that if we agree to this conclusion, the lacunae in explications of 
‘production’, ‘causal mechanism’, ‘genuine derivation’, and the like, as used 
in this context (as opposed to their more down to earth uses) are no longer 
a pertinent problem for us.  Such concepts would presumably have to be 
mobilized if we tried to provide a thorough explication of the Appearance 
from Reality Criterion, going beyond the logic of these terms.  But if the 
criterion marked in fact only a temporary research program in the sciences, 
and is rejected from our account of what science is, those problems can be 
left aside in philosophy of science.
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